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Electoral Politics in the Context of
Separatism and Political Divergence:
An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary
elections in Jammu & Kashmir
Rekha Chowdhary
1 As in any other state of India, the 2009 Parliamentary election in the State of Jammu and
Kashmir can be seen as an important moment reflecting the nature and direction of
politics as it is evolving at the local level. One can gauge the changing nature of power
politics; the context of popular participation; the nature of competition and the intensity
and depth of democracy in the State. However, the context of the conflict situation which
has engulfed this  state  for  the past  two decades provides  additional  meaning to the
electoral  exercise  here.  This  paper  will  therefore  seek  to  locate  the  Parliamentary
elections in the context of separatism. Specifically, it will focus on the implications of
parallel existence of the separatist and the mainstream politics on power politics of the
State. Separatism, it may be mentioned here, emerged as the dominant political response
in  Kashmir  during  the  post-1989  period.  Manifested  simultaneously  through  armed
militancy as well as spontaneous popular upsurge, this political response has continued
to have a hold over the politics of the Valley throughout the last two decades.1 Despite the
restoration of mainstream politics after its complete erosion during the initial stages of
separatism, the separatist politics continues to define the political responses of Kashmir.
The two kinds of politics seem to be operating side by side, overlapping at a number of
points and impacting each other in an interesting manner. It is in this context of overlap
between the separatist and mainstream politics that the 2009 Parliamentary election will
be analysed. 
2 The paper will also highlight the context of diversity and political divergence within the
state and its implications on electoral politics. Focusing on the political divergence at the
regional level, it will analyse the process of political mobilisation around the regional
identity politics. 
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3 The immediate context of the elections is framed by two significant political events that
preceed these elections—first, the Amarnath agitation which engulfed almost the whole
state  during  the  summer  of  2008  and  Assembly  elections that  were  concluded  in
December 2008.
 
The context of electoral politics in Kashmir:
Implications of conflict situation and separatist
politics 
4 The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been affected by the conflict situation ever since
1947. The ruler of this erstwhile Princely state, after remaining indecisive for quite some
time, signed the instrument of Accession with India under troubled conditions created by
the tribal invaders supported by Pakistan army, on 26th October 1947. The issue assumed
international character with India taking the case to the UN. With Pakistan holding on a
part of J&K and contesting the validity of Accession of the other part with India, this State
continued to remain a bone of contention between the two countries. 
5 However, besides external dimension of the conflict which has afflicted this state ever
since 1947, there is also an internal dimension which is defined by Kashmir’s relationship
with India.  This relation has witnessed a protracted tension, especially since 1953.  In
1953, Sheikh Abdullah, the popular Kashmiri leader was removed from power and
detained  for  a  long  time.  Before  his  detention,  Sheikh  had  been  instrumental  in
negotiating a special constitutional status for the state. However, with his dismissal not
only  this  status  was  gradually  eroded,  but  Kashmiris  were  also  denied  democratic
channels of political expression. Excessive central intrusion in the politics of the state
distorted even the  most  developed indigenous  political  institutions  like  the  National
Conference and distanced governance from the popular responses (Bose 2003: 66-7) All
this resulted in an accumulated political discontent which was manifested throughout the
post-1953 period. 
6 Though Sheikh was brought back to power in 1975,  political  discontent continued to
manifest itself. One of the major reasons for this discontent was the lack of any initiative
in restoring the constitutional autonomy of the state, the major pre-condition of Sheikh
for resuming power. However, due to the towering personality of the Sheikh, particularly
his capacity to assert autonomy of his government vis-à-vis the intrusive politics of the
Centre, the discontent was quite subdued. But the incapacity of his successor and son, Dr.
Farooq Abdullah, to keep the Centre away from meddling into the politics of the state,
resulted in intensifying the already existing feeling of discontent. The tension continued
to grow after the dismissal, engineered by the Congress—the ruling party in the Centre—,
of  Farooq  Abbdullah’s  government,  which  had  obtained  a  massive  popular  mandate
during the 1983 Assembly elections, (Abdullah 1985: 9). In addition, the pressure built
upon Farooq Abdullah and the National Conference to enter into an electoral alliance
with  the  Congress  party  increased  the  dissatisfaction,  since  the  Congress  party  was
popularly held responsible for distorting local politics since early fifties. 
7 However, the real political outrage in the Valley was triggered by the 1987 Assembly
election, generally perceived to be highly rigged, which led to the massive victory of NC-
Congress combine and the defeat of most of the Muslim United Front (MUF) candidates.
The MUF was formed in 1986 to give vent to the growing popular resentment against the
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alliance were seen to be manipulated. Despite polling 38.2% votes (compared to 45.2%
votes  of  the  NC-Congress  combine),  the  opposition  comprised  of  MUF  and  People’s
Conference2 could register victory barely in four constituencies. The fact that the margin
of victory of some of the candidates belonging to the ruling combine was very low, and
the number of invalid votes in these constituencies was quite high, generated a feeling of
scepticism regarding the validity of the results3 (Chowdhary & Rao 2003: 189-219). 
8 It was in the wake of disillusionment with the internal politics in general that the present
phase of conflict was started in the Valley. What marked the beginning of this phase was
the decision of some of the Kashmiri  youth who had participated in the elections as
contestants, election agents, campaigners and sympathisers of candidates to cross over to
Pakistan administered Kashmir to take training in armed militancy. Moreover, apart from
armed militancy,  a  spontaneous  popular  upsurge  grew against  the  Indian State  that
eroded  the  mainstream  politics  in  the  Valley  of  Kashmir.  The  separatist  politics
manifested both through the armed militancy as well as spontaneous political response
took a more organised form with the establishment of the All Party Hurriyat Conference
(APHC) in 1993. The establishment of APHC as an umbrella organisation was necessitated
by the proliferation of militant groups which were at times operating at cross purposes.
The  ideological  differences  between  these  organisations  and  their  internal  strife,
especially the war declared by Hizbul Mujahideen on the JKLF, generated a need for a
loose-knit organisation that could give a sense of unity and common direction to those
participating in the movement (Schofield 2000: 143-88).
9 So much was the sway of the separatist politics in the Kashmir Valley, that it completely
eroded  the  mainstream  politics  right  from  1989.  While  Jammu  and  Ladakh  regions
remained more or less normal, there was no scope for the mainstream power politics in
the Valley.4 As the legitimacy of the mainstream politics was openly questioned by the
militants on the one hand, and the defiant masses on the streets of Kashmir on the other,
the state was placed under the President’s rule for a prolonged period of time. In 1996,
the  electoral  process  was  restored  but  the  government  that  was  formed  after  the
Assembly election could not gain credence in the Valley of Kashmir. Since the elections
were organised with the  help  of  the  security  forces  and the  counter-insurgents,  the
government formed after the elections was not seen to be representing the popular will.
Though NC had given the slogan of ‘autonomy’ to regain its hold in the local politics,
there were not many takers of this slogan (Chowdhary 2000: 2600-1).
10 Despite the restoration of political process, separatist sentiment continued to hold sway.
Though Kashmiris, by this time, had started reacting against the ‘culture of violence’ and
very  subtly  rejecting  and  de-legitimising  militancy,  their  sympathies  with  separatist
politics  continued to  be  expressed through various  demonstrations  organised by  the
Hurriyat Conference. Mainstream politics, therefore, continued to remain challenged.
11 A number of factors changed the popular response towards electoral and mainstream
politics. Firstly, the urge for normalcy after the prolonged period of militant violence led
to some kind of change of attitude towards the process of governance. By the time the
2002 Assembly election was concluded, the political processes related to governance had
already found some legitimate space in Kashmir’s  politics.  Without any contradiction
towards their separatist sentiments, people started involving themselves in the ‘politics
related to governance’. This process was further boosted by a change in the nature of
political mobilisation. With the emergence of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) as another
Kashmir-based party, not only the electoral competition became quite intense, but the
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electoral discourse also became more grounded in the local realities. PDP referred to the
Human Rights violations taking place in Kashmir and the need for providing ‘healing
touch’  to people,  and also raised the issue of  conflict  and its  resolution through the
process  of  dialogue both with both Pakistan and militants.  Also significant  were the
initiatives being taken by the Vajpayee-led Government: declaring that India had made
mistakes in Kashmir, Vajpayee made a commitment to hold a ‘free and fair election’. This
commitment was an indirect acknowledgement of the intrusive role that the Centre had
been playing in the power politics of the State since 1950s. 
12 The impact of all  these factors was significantly visible through the voters’  response.
Although the overall turnout during the 2002 Assembly elections was much lower than
the 1996 Assembly elections, the participation was more voluntary rather than coerced by
the presence of security forces in any manner, which made the 30% turnout in Kashmir
Valley quite significant.5 
13 The 2002 Assembly elections, generally acknowledged to be fair, helped build some kind
of  confidence  in  the  electoral  institutions  and  processes.  Till  now,  the  formation  of
government and its sustenance in power was more dependent on the support of  the
Centre rather than the mandate of  people.  The electoral  politics  therefore was quite
distanced from the popular responses.6 Breaking the hegemony of the single dominant
party also brought an alternative to the PDP-Congress coalition power. The possibility
that a government could be changed through the participation of people in the electoral
process, rather than through the manipulative politics of the Centre, strengthened the
stake of the people in this process. 
14 Moreover, the response of people towards the electoral process was further transformed
through the intensity of competition after the creation of the People’s Democratic Party.
The emergence of  another Kashmir-based political  party invigorated the mainstream
political space. 
15 Before the emergence of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), National Conference (NC) had
hegemonised the politics of Kashmir region (Chowdhary & Rao 2004: 1521-7). It based its
on playing a role in organising the resistance movement against the feudal Dogra rule
before 1947 and the radical land reforms that it had initiated after it came into power in
1947. Its emphasis on economic and political reconstruction of the state, in pursuance of
the  New  Kashmir  Manifesto,  the  ideological  blueprint  of  the  party—particularly  the
redistribution of the land to the landless, debt relief to the peasants, free education till
the Post Graduate stage—endeared this party to the Kashmiri masses and they formed the
base of this party. The support was strengthened by Sheikh Abdullah’s charisma until his
removal from power in 1953.7
16 With  the  ouster  of  the  Sheikh  Abdullah  from  power  and  subsequent  formation  of
Plebiscite Front,  the support base of  NC shifted to this organisation in the post-1953
period. However, NC continued to officially operate as the ruling party of the state under
the leadership of  Bakshi  Ghulam Mohammed.  But the ruling NC legitimacy remained
contested throughout and it survived more on the basis of the support from the Congress
party  than on the basis  of  local  support.  So  overwhelming was  the influence of  the
Congress that the NC ultimately merged with it in mid-sixties. After 1975 when Sheikh
Abdullah came back to power politics, the Plebiscite Front was dissolved and the NC was
revived. From 1975 to 1996, the NC was again the most influential party of Jammu and
Kashmir, particularly in the Valley.
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17 Though the NC continued to dominate the political scene of the State, its support base
gradually declined. In the background of the Kashmir’s politics between 1953 and 1975
when  people  were  mobilised  around  the  theme  of  contestation  of  the  existing
relationship of the state with India, the return of Sheikh Abdullah to power without much
change in the status quo, there was a simmering discontent in the Valley. However, due
to the towering personality of Sheikh Abdullah, much of this discontent did not take a
concrete shape during his life time. But after his death, the party now led by his son
Farooq Abdullah started losing space.  Even when Congress as the ruling party in the
Centre had manoeuvred the ouster of his government in 1984, he had entered into an
alliance with this party in 1986 and contested the 1987 election leading this alliance. 
18 As the party became dependent on the centre for its political survival rather than on
mass support at the ground level,  it  distanced itself from popular concerns. That the
party,  despite  obtaining  massive  mandate  was  disconnected  from popular  responses
became clear in 1989 when the Valley came in the grip of militancy and witnessed a
massive upsurge (Schofield 2003: 143-88).8 In the political crisis that ensued, not only NC
was forced to withdraw from the political scene but had to face the maximum brunt of
violence.  Devoid  of  legitimacy,  NC leadership  went  into  hibernation.  And even after
coming back on the political scene by contesting the 1996 Assembly election and forming
the government, it could not regain its previous legitimacy. 
19 With the emergence of PDP in late nineties, the context of the power politics changed
drastically. As another Kashmir-based party, it not only challenged the dominance of the
NC but  changed the very logic  of  power politics.  Adopting a  political  discourse  that
reflected the popular concerns of people in a situation of conflict, PDP sought to reduce
the gap between popular aspirations and the power politics. It borrowed issues from the
separatist camp and brought them to the centre of mainstream political space. Thus the
party suggested ‘dialogue’ with the militants and separatists as a way towards solving the
conflict;  easing out pressure upon people from the excessive presence of the security
forces; and reducing drastically the number of cases of Human Rights violations. It was
this ‘people-oriented’ strategy of PDP that helped bring an end the hegemony of NC.
During the 2002 Assembly elections, the PDP managed to capture as many as 16 seats
from Kashmir Valley.9
20 The  mainstream  political  space  was  able  to  expand  substantially  during  the  period
between 2002 and 2008. From a situation in pre-2002 period when political parties and
leaders could not freely move in public space and could not organise public meetings,
2007 saw frequent rallies being organised by almost all the political parties in various
parts  of  the  Valley—in  the  anticipation  of  the  coming  election,  almost  one  year  in
advance (Chowdhary 2008: 22).
21 Expansion  of  the  electoral  space,  however,  has  not  taken  place  at  the  cost  of  the
separatist  sentiment  and politics.  In  fact,  the  separatist sentiment  remains  intact  in
Kashmir. The legitimisation of the mainstream politics has been possible only because
there is no contradiction between the separatist and mainstream politics and people are
not forced to make a choice between the two. The two are seen as reflecting two different
spheres of politics: one dealing with issues relating to governance; and the other dealing
with conflict  situation and its resolution.  Right since the 2002 elections, the political
parties have sought to restrict  the scope of  electoral  politics to the issues related to
‘governance’  only.  Recognising the larger political realities of  the state,  these parties
acknowledge the widely prevalent separatist sentiment and the need of addressing it. In
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no way do they claim that the extension of electoral space amounts to shrinking the
separatist space. 
22 The parallel existence of the two kinds of politics reflects a complexity that exists at the
ground level, generated both by the change in the dynamics of the separatist politics, and
the nature of popular responses. With the decline in armed militancy, the assertion of the
separatist sentiments is taking place through the mass politics. The more the mainstream
politics is expanding, the more it becomes rooted in local responses, while generating a
need  to  reaffirm  the  popular  separatist  sentiments.  In  a  situation  where  conflict
resolution has not taken a concrete shape, a danger is always felt that participation in
mainstream  politics  may  be  a  sign  of  political  normalcy  which  might  put  the  whole
question of conflict resolution to the back burner. Thus has emerged the very peculiar
situation in Kashmir, where mainstream political processes and assertion of separatist
sentiments alternate. It is interesting to note how abruptly the situation changes in the
Valley. While there was a tremendous electoral upsurge throughout the year of 2007 and
early 2008, it was suddenly halted by an equally strong assertion of separatist politics
during the Amarnath agitation. The affirmation of the mainstream politics immediately
followed when people participated in large number during the 2008 Assembly elections. 
 
The Amarnath agitation
23 Amarnath land row engulfed the whole state throughout the summer of 2008. To begin
with,  there  was  a  massive  agitation in  Kashmir,  which was  followed by a  prolonged
agitation in Jammu. This was once again followed by a renewed mass upsurge in Kashmir.
The entire issue initially revolved around a government order diverting forest land to
Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB), and subsequently around the revocation of the same
order.10 The order gave the SASB the right to erect pre-fabricated temporary structures
for housing pilgrims during the period of the Amarnath yatra. However, more than the
order, it was the assertion of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the SASB—representing
the ex-officio chairman, the Governor, General S.K. Sinha—, that land had been given
permanently  to  the  Board  to  build  permanent  structures  that  generated  a  massive
response in Kashmir.11 
24 The separatists used the issue of diversion of land to SASB to create suspicion of a grand
design behind the order aimed at altering the Muslim-majority character of the state. The
fear  of  ‘demographic  change’,  therefore,  became  the  basis  of  mass  mobilization  in
Kashmir. To quell the agitation which had assumed dangerous proportions in Kashmir,
the order was revoked but this only generated another kind of polemics in Jammu. The
Bharatiya Janata Party and like-minded organizations termed the revocation as an assault
on ‘Hindu sentiments’ and demanded restoration of the original order. The revocation of
the order was portrayed as anti-Jammu decision taken under the pressure of separatists
to appease the ‘Muslims of Kashmir’ without taking into consideration the sentiments of
the ‘Hindus of Jammu’.
25 In both the regions, the agitation brought in focus the radical elements who sought to
mobilise people around emotive issues. In Kashmir, people were mobilised by the Geelani-
led Hurriyat Conference (as well as by the PDP) around the fear of demographic change
(the fear that by systematic efforts the Muslim-majority character of the State will be
changed) and in Jammu, the mobilisation took place around the religious sentiments of
Hindus (supposedly hurt by the revocation of the Land Order). 
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26 The agitation had far reaching implications for the politics of the State. In the Valley of
Kashmir, there was aggressive affirmation of separatist sentiments reminding one of the
massive popular demonstrations of early 1990. However, unlike the separatism of the last
few  years  which  was  marked  by  the  centrality  of  moderate  leadership,  it  was  now
directed by hardliners. 
27 The public display of the separatist sentiments during this time gave an indication that
beyond the electoral vibrancy, the deep-rooted sense of alienation continued to prevail.
Throughout the period of agitation one could feel that the mainstream politics had once
more regressed to the background and the separatist politics had become ascendant.
28 A  significant  implication  of  the  Amarnath  agitation  was  the  fractured  relationship
between Jammu and Kashmir. Though politically divergent, the two major regions had
never  been  placed in  such  an  antagonistic  relationship.12 The  political  discord  had
reached beyond the usual  issues of  regional  disparities and had started affecting the
economic  and  trade  relationship  between  the  two  regions.  The  most  dangerous
implication of the agitation was the communally divisive mobilisation and the resultant
communal tension in the state. 
29 Along with the religious factor, it was the regional identity politics that provided stimulus
to the Amarnath agitation. In Jammu, a feeling of political discontent has been persisting
since early fifties. The feeling emanates from the context of power politics of the State
which  is  perceived  to  be  ‘Kashmir-centric’  having  negligible  or  token  presence  of
Jammu’s political elite (Puri 1966: 77-81). It also has much to do with the specificity of the
conflict situation of Kashmir and the response of the Central government. There is a
feeling that  in all  political  negotiations undertaken to address the Kashmir problem,
Jammu is taken for granted and that the political  arrangements are imposed on this
region.  This  feeling  is  accentuated  by  the  context  of  political  divergence  and  the
ideological  divide between the two regions.  The logic  of  Kashmir’s  dominant politics
governed  by  the  contestation  of  the  State’s  relationship  with  India  and  manifested
through the discourse of ‘Autonomy’/‘Azadi’ does not extend itself to the Jammu region.
The politics of this region on the contrary, is governed by the regional asymmetry in the
power politics and resource distribution. 
30 The dominant political discourse of Jammu revolves around the issues related to regional
‘deprivation and neglect’. ‘Kashmir’ in this discourse forms the ‘centre of power’ within
the state and is perceived to be dominating both the power structure of the state and the
economic and material resources. It is on this basis that popular perceptions have been
articulated around the notion of regional imbalances and a number of agitations have
been organised in Jammu. The context of regional divergence and regional imbalances
has come to overwhelm the political logic of Jammu, not only in the Hindu-dominated
areas  where  organisations  of  Hindu-Right  have  been  mobilising  people  around  the
demand for abolition of Article 370 guaranteeing the special status of the State, but also
in the Muslim-dominated districts  which are relatively more backward.  Leaders here
blame the Kashmir-centric power politics for the perpetual neglect of these districts. Ever
since the early fifties, there has been a perception throughout Jammu region that the
public policy and political decisions favour Kashmir while ignoring Jammu. The political
response of the region is therefore organised around the issue of regional imbalances.
The range of  this  response  however  varies  from the demand for  regional  autonomy
(emanating from the centrist  politics),  to the demand for a  separate state of  Jammu
(emanating from the Hindu Rightist politics). There is also a third demand, coming from
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backward areas of Jammu region, for some kind of sub-regional arrangement (the Hill
Development Councils for instance).
31 Regional  divergence  has  been manifested  in  the  politics  of  the  state  in  a  variety  of
manners. However, despite this divergence the two regions of the state never followed a
confrontationist path. It was during the period of militancy that the political divergence
was reflected in a sharp manner. However, even this did not result in collision between
the two regions. On the contrary, there evolved a feeling that despite the specificity of
conflict in the Kashmir region, there was a need to evolve a consensus between the two
regions. The conflict resolution process, it was understood (both by the political elite in
Kashmir as well as in Jammu) needed to be inclusive so as to represent the divergent
political voices within the State. 
32 Amarnath agitation became the first occasion in the history of politics of the state when
the two major regions of  the state were placed in an antagonistic  situation.  Both in
Jammu as well as in Kashmir, the masses were mobilised in a manner that enhanced
regional chauvinism. Worse still, the mobilisation ultimately took a communal route and
resulted not only in the tension between the two major communities of the state but also
in carving of new political constituencies based on religion. 
33 In the absence of a regional party, the politics of regional discontent is often appropriated
by  the  Hindu Rightist  parties  and organisations  which  combine  regional  issues  with
religious sentiments. Since the onset of militancy, the parties of Hindu Right have sought
to sharpen the regional identity politics.13 Amarnath agitation was one such occasion
when the Hindu Rightist organisations could mobilise masses in Hindu dominated areas
of Jammu by arousing regional sentiment combined with religious one. 
34 Regional chauvinism not only dominated the Jammu region, but Kashmir as well. After
the onset of the coalition era which gave a visibility to Jammu in the power politics, a
politics has been generated in Kashmir around the issue of its discrimination vis-à-vis
Jammu. In radicalising the regional politics of Kashmir, PDP has had a clear role to play.
In its competition with NC, this party has often sought to give an aggressive edge to
Kashmiri regional politics and also add religious dimensions to it. One could clearly see
the role  of  PDP in  raising the  regional  sentiments  in  Kashmir  during the  Amarnath
agitation. Though responsible for taking the decision on transfer of land to the SASB, this
party joined the side of agitators to demand its revocation, terming the Land Order as an
assault  to Kashmiri  identity and endangering the Muslim-dominated character of  the
State. 
 
The 2008 Assembly elections
35 The  2008  elections  took  place  immediately  after  the  Amarnath  agitation.  The
unprecedented regional and communal polarisation that afflicted the state during this
agitation, therefore, was bound to have repercussions on this election. 
36 In  the  Valley,  separatist  politics  was  the  highlight  of  the  agitation.  The  separatist
leadership had developed a renewed confidence that  people who had participated in
massive demonstrations against the Indian state during the agitation would not come
forward  to  participate  in  elections,  and  the  electoral  exercise  would  once  again  be
reduced  to  a  farce.  However,  the  boycott  call  was  defied  and  there  was  massive
participation of people in the Assembly election. Against 29.64% voter turnout in the 2002
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Assembly election, the 2008 election recorded 51.64%. In almost all the districts and all
the constituencies of the Valley, the percentage of the voter-turnout was much higher
than the last Assembly elections. Throughout the Valley one could see the images of long
queues outside the polling booth showing the eagerness to cast votes. The message was
very clear: despite the centrality of the separatist politics, the mainstream politics has
been extended and legitimised. The proximity of the people with the power politics, the
location of power politics in local responses of people and their growing stake in the local
politics—all  had led to  the deepening of  democracy in  this  state,  particularly  in  the
Valley.14 This  is  why  the  usual  sense  of  scepticism  with  regard  to  the  democratic
institutions was replaced by a greater involvement in the process of government making.
 
Table 1. Comparative voter turnout in Kashmir – 2002 and 2008 Assembly elections*
 







* Source: Election Commission of India. All the tables contain data from the Election Commission of India.
37 Although the voter turnout was not affected by the Amarnath agitation, same is not the
case  with  the  electoral  outcome.  In  an  intensely  contested  election  which  gave  a
fragmented verdict, PDP and BJP emerged as the gainers. While PDP was able to increase
its share of seats in Kashmir region from 16 in 2002 to 19 and its vote percentage arose
from 24.48% to 27.42%, it could also gain entry in Jammu and register its victory in 2 seats
with a voter turnout of 6.88% in its favour. BJP, however emerged as the biggest gainer
since it could increase its share of seats from one to eleven. Its vote share in Jammu
region increased from 17.80% to 22.94%. 
38 NC was able to retain 28 seats that it had in 2002, but it suffered some losses in Jammu
region where it could win only 6 seats as compared to 9 seats in 2002. Congress also could
not fare so well. As against 20 seats in 2002, this time it could win only 17 seats. As against
21.38% votes in 2002, only 18.17% votes were cast in its favour in 2008. It suffered loss
both in Jammu (from 26.40% to 23.98%) as well as in Kashmir (from 14.41% to 10%). 
 
Table 2. Comparative percentage of votes polled by different parties – 2002 and 2008 Assembly
elections
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 2002 2008 2002 2008 2002 2008
NC 28.23 23.59 35.62 27.50 23.95 20.16
INC 21.38 18.17 14.41 10.48 26.40 23.98
PDP 09.04 15.68 24.51 27,41 01.76 06.88
BJP 12.15 12.73 01.60 00.96 17.80 22.94
JKNPP 04.68 3.39 00.03 0.78 07.02 05.68
 
Table 3. Comparative share of seats attained by political parties – 2002 and 2008 Assembly
elections






 2002 2008 2002 2008 2002 2008
NC 28 28 18 20 09 06
INC 20 17 05 03 15 13
PDP 16 21 16 19 00 02
BJP 01 11 00 00 01 11
JKNPP 04 03 00 00 04 03
39 The results of Assembly elections clearly reflect the divide created during the agitation.
The increase in BJP’s and PDP’s share of votes and seats follow the successful aggressive
mobilisation of the regional and religious identities by these two parties. Rather than the
centrist forces represented by Congress and National Conference, it was the triumph for
those parties which had stretched the politics of the state to the extremely polarised
responses.
40 Before the Amarnath agitation, PDP was not in a very comfortable position in Kashmir.
After remaining in power for more than five years, it was facing the anti-incumbency
factor. In the context of its radical pro-Kashmir politics, its association with Congress was
becoming  a  liability.  In  all  likelihood  therefore,  NC  was  poised  to  win  a  substantial
number of seats in the Valley, had the agitation not taken place. However, the Amarnath
agitation changed the situation for the PDP which severed its link with the Congress and
joined  the  side  of  agitators.  Since  the  agitation  honed  the  Kashmiri  regional  and
separatist sentiments, PDP’s gain was ensured. In the regionally polarised politics where
Jammu’s rightwing forces were provoking anti-Kashmir sentiments, PDP was projecting
itself  as  the  redeemer  of  the  Kashmiri  sentiment.  Its  leader  Mehbooba  Mufti  was
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vociferously  campaigning  against  the  ‘economic  blockade’  of  Kashmir  by  Jammu’s
agitators. In this context of regional and communal polarisation, the PDP’s increase in
popularity was clearly reflected during the Assembly election. 
41 The electoral polarisation on the communal basis was more clearly established in the
Jammu region.15 Here BJP could register its victory in the record number of 11 seats. The
highest number of seats that this party had ever attained was 8 during the 1996 Assembly
election,  as  an immediate post-militancy reaction from the region.  In the context  of
violence, BJP could succeed in extending its constituency. However, as the violence level
came down, the influence of BJP also weakened. During the 2002 Assembly election, this
party only managed to win one seat.
42 The constituency of BJP’s politics was in any case shrinking due to the changed nature of
power politics of the State.  The extreme politics of regional discontent on which the
popularity of this party depends, was getting blunted in the context of coalitional power
sharing. For the first time in the political history of the state, Jammu had a fair share of
power in the state. The Congress having its base in Jammu and PDP in Kashmir created a
regional balance.16
43 It is important to note that since 2002, there was no major protest organised in Jammu
region around any regional issue. However, the Amarnath agitation provided space and
opportunity  for  BJP  and  other  like-minded  organisations  to  mobilise  the  Hindu
constituency.  The  massive  mandate  in  favour  of  BJP  in  Jammu’s  Hindu-dominated
districts indicated that region was now getting communally polarised. 
44 The fact that the PDP could register its victory in two Muslim dominated constituencies
of  the  Jammu  region  provided  additional  reason  to  believe  the  growing  impact  of
communal  polarisation.  Being  a  Kashmir-centric  party  which  has  been  seeking  to
legitimise its politics by emphasising its ‘pro-Kashmir’  orientation with a pro-Muslim
bias,  PDP’s  entry  into  Jammu’s  Muslim  dominated  areas  and  its  success  in  two
predominantly Muslim constituencies was an indication of the communal polarisation
that was taking deeper roots in the State. In a way this reflected a very dangerous signal
of an extension of Kashmiri constituency to Jammu’s Muslim pockets, thereby creating
new alignments. So far, the political divide in the state generally has been regional rather
than religious based. This is not to argue that communal factor did not operate at all. On
the contrary, the communal identity was invoked for electoral purposes by almost all the
political  parties,  including  the  National  Conference.  However,  the  impact  of  such
mobilisation remained limited and did not succeed in carving a communal constituency.
During the Amarnath agitation, the aggressive Hindu religious mobilisation and backlash
against Muslims, in certain cases,  resulted in communal wedge. As a result,  Kashmiri
leaders both from the separatist camp as well as from the mainstream parties sought to
create a political constituency among Jammu Muslims. The unprecedented victory of PDP
in two Muslim dominated constituencies signalled the success in this direction. 
45 The impact of Amarnath agitation as reflected in the Assembly elections raised major
questions related to the future of the state. If the divisive forces were to dominate the
politics of the state, it would threaten the integrity of the State. The state, despite its
diversity and  political divergence,  had continued  to  remain  integrated  due  to  the
endurance of the centrist forces. The centrist forces actually affirmed the plural nature of
society. With the radical forces occupying the central space, the very plurality of the state
has been endangered. 
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The 2009 Parliamentary elections
46 The  2009  Parliamentary  elections  took  place  barely  few  months  after  the  Assembly
elections, thus dealing with the concerns and anxieties raised due to the outcome of the
Assembly elections. This election, being relatively more distanced from the Amarnath
agitation,  provided  important  clues  about  the  depth  of  the  impact  of  the  divisive
tendencies sharpened during the agitation. It also provided interesting insights into the
relationship between the mainstream and separatist politics in Kashmir. 
 
The context of separatist politics
47 Defiance of  the boycott  call  and enthusiastic participation of  people in the Assembly
elections resulted in a sense of demoralisation in the separatist camp. The growing space
of the mainstream politics did not induce a simultaneous shrinking of the separatist space
17, but it did lead to a change in orientation within the separatist camp. The impact of this
shift  could  be  seen  during  the  Parliamentary  elections,  when  Sajjad  Gani  Lone,  a
prominent separatist took the decision to contest the 2009 Parliamentary election from
Baramula constituency of North Kashmir. 
48 Sajjad Lone led one of the leading separatist organisation, the People’s Conference (PC)
which was a part of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) right from the time of its
inception in 1993. As an amalgam of the separatist and militant organisations active in
Kashmir,  APHC represented the popular separatist  sentiment in Kashmir.18 A G Lone,
father of Sajjad Lone and the founder of the People’s Conference was one of the most
prominent leaders of the APHC. 
49 Though many other separatists had earlier joined the electoral fray, the Sajjad Lone’s
decision to contest Parliamentary election had an altogether different impact. Being a
high profile separatist, at par with the top separatist leaders like Mirwaiz Omar Farooq,
Ali Shah Geelani and Yasin Malik, one could see in his decision to contest election a crack
within  the  separatist  politics.  The  crack  was  very  small,  not  seeming  to  affect  the
separatists overtly but in reality had had a great psychological effect on them. More so
since his decision to contest election came in the wake of the massive participation of
Kashmiris in the Assembly elections. 
50 Separatists had been very aggressive in their boycott call during the 2009 Parliamentary
elections.  Though the call  was initially given by Syed Ali  Shah Geelani,  the hardliner
leader of the Hurriyat (G), soon the other faction of Hurriyat led by Mirwaiz Omer Farooq
and other organisations joined the boycott campaign.
51 The voter enthusiasm was quite low this time. Against 51% turnout during the Assembly
election,  only  31.24% votes  were  registered during this  election.  It  was  partially  the
impact  of  the aggressive campaigning by the separatists  that  the voter  participation
during the Parliamentary elections was relatively lower. 
 
Table 4. Comparative voter turnout in Kashmir region – 2008 Assembly elections and 2009
Parliamentary elections
 Voter turnout (%)
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52 It is important to analyse as to why the same voters who showed enthusiasm in 2008
shied away from the same process in the Parliamentary election? Why did the separatists’
call  for boycott  succeeded this  time? A number of  reasons can be attributed to this.
Firstly, the kind of proximity and involvement that the voters felt with the Assembly
elections was missing during the Lok Sabha elections. Governance is becoming important
to people and therefore they are keen to have a party in power with which they identify.19
This is why they defied the call for boycott during the Assembly elections. During the
Parliamentary election, the boycott call could become effective because people did not
have similar stakes. Not voting during these elections was a message that many Kashmiris
would have wanted to give to the Central government—that their participation in the
Assembly elections should not be construed as their complete rejection of the separatist
politics.  In the context  of  the complexity of  relationship between the separatist  and
mainstream politics  in  Kashmir,  it  needs  to  be  reiterated  that  the  expansion of  the
mainstream politics does not necessarily take place at the cost of the separatist political
space. Separatist sentiments continue to dominate the popular political responses despite
their positive response to the mainstream politics. It is the assertion of the separatist
sentiments that was reflected in the boycott politics. Lest the participation of the people
during the Assembly elections should be seen as an endorsement of Indian position on
Kashmir,  the  people  sought  to  use  the  strategy  of  boycott  politics  to  assert  their
continued contestation of this position. 
53 However, despite the lower voter turnout in the Parliamentary elections as compared to
their  turnout  in  the  Assembly  elections,  participation  of  Kashmiris  showed  an
improvement as compared to their participation in the earlier Parliamentary election. In
all the three constituencies of the Valley, the voter turnout this time was higher than in
2004 Parliamentary elections.
 
Table 5. Comparative voter turnout in all the constituencies of the State – 2004 and 2009
Parliamentary elections
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54 On the basis of this data one can infer that although separatist politics has affected the
responses of people in the Valley to the extent that many of them chose to remain away
from the Parliamentary elections, their response cannot be construed to mean a total
rejection of the electoral process. As the electoral data of 2004 elections shows, the stake
of people in the Parliamentary elections is not as high as in the Assembly elections. Even
when the faith of the people in the electoral politics had increased due to a very credible
electoral  process  during the 2002 Assembly elections,  their  participation in the 2004
Parliamentary elections remained low. The overall expansion of the electoral space that
was taking place in the post-2002 period was not reflected during the Parliamentary
elections,  even when at  the  ground level  one could see  the  difference.  The political
environment was energised by intense political competition between the two regional
parties—the NC and the PDP which were not only mobilising people and holding huge
rallies  but  were  also  engaging  people  at  the  discursive  level  through their  different
versions/models of peace process. One could see the intensity of this politics throughout
the year 2007 and 2008 (till the Amarnath agitation took place). The massive participation
of  the  people  during  the  2008  Assembly  elections  clearly  established as  to  how this
politics had been legitimised.
55 However, separatist politics remains the reality of Kashmir and despite the extension of
mainstream politics, and will remain intact mainly due to the fact that there is a long-
standing alienation among people which needs to be addressed. Much of this alienation is
the result of the disjuncture between the power politics and the local responses. Politics
generally operated at a level where people were not involved—even in the discursive
sense. Not a single local debate took place about the kind of political arrangements the
state required, or the major political changes implemented since 1953. The competitive
nature  of  power  politics  has  changed this  context.  Rather  than depending upon the
Centre for its legitimaty, the power politics now depends on popular responses and is
rooted in the local milieu. 
 
Implications of the Amarnath agitation 
56 To what extent had the Amarnath agitation changed the nature and course of politics of
the state? Was the political response reflected during the Assembly election symptomatic
of the change in the nature of politics? Or was it merely a passing phenomenon? An
analysis  of  the  2009  Parliamentarly  election  is  important  for  reflecting  upon  these
questions.
57 Though  not  much  time  had  passed  between  the  Assembly  and  the  Parliamentary
elections, the ground level situation in the state had witnessed substantial changes which
had implications on the Parliamentary elections.
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58 First of all, the centrist forces came to acquire central space in the politics of the State. In
the face of the fragmented verdict during the Assembly elections, the NC and Congress
had joined together to form the coalition government. 
59 The Congress and the NC are the two parties of the State which have greater stakes in the
inclusive politics. The Congress has its stronghold in Jammu region, distinguishing itself
from the BJP by avoiding to present itself as a party of Hindus. It has therefore acquired a
solid base in many Muslim pockets of the region. The Gujjars, the Muslim community of
the state, for instance, have been strong supporters of the Congress party. Besides, to
succeed in power politics, the party has to extend its constituency beyond the Jammu
region by increasing its presence and stakes in Kashmir and Ladakh. Like the Congress,
the NC has its presence in all the three regions. Though Kashmir remains its primary
constituency, it has its existence and therefore a stake in all the three regions of the state.
The history of the party located in its progressive ideology also defines it as a centrist
party. 
60 Moreover, the political mobilisation that had taken place during the period of agitation
lost  its  impact soon after the situation became normal,  both in Jammu as well  as in
Kashmir. In Jammu, however, there was a rethinking about the agitation and the effect
that it had on the region as a whole. Apart from the huge economic loss that people
suffered due to the agitation, there was a feeling that Jammu did not gain much from the
agitation. The massive regional sentiment that was generated during the agitation was
not translated into any positive achievement for the region. On the contrary there was lot
of negative baggage of the agitation. The traders, who form the economic backbone of the
region,  had to  face  the  wrath of  their  Kashmiri  counterparts  who responded to  the
‘economic blockade’ of the Valley during the agitation, by taking a decision to bypass
Jammu in trade activities. However, it was the communal aftertaste of the agitation that
made the people uneasy.20 The aggressive anti-Muslim posture of the fringe organisations
activated during the agitation, the sporadic attacks on some Muslims and the outburst of
communal  violence  in  two towns  of  the  region  did  not  go  very  well  with  the  local
sensibilities.
 
The impact of rethinking the Parliamentary elections 
61 Being  partners  in  power,  the  NC  and  the  Congress  had  reached a  pre-electoral
arrangement for contesting the 2009 Parliamentary elections. Due to its stronghold in the
Valley, the NC contested the three seats of the Valley, while the Congress having its base
in Jammu, fielded its candidates in both constituencies of the region. The third seat of
Ladakh was also contested by the Congress. As a consequence of this alliance, the contest
was regionally localised. There was a direct fight between the NC and PDP in the Valley
and between the Congress and BJP in Jammu region. 
62 The strategy of the coalition partners to contest in alliance helped them to gain both in
the Valley as well as in Jammu region. The NC-Congress combine was able to sweep the
Parliamentary elections winning five of the six seats. The sixth seat was also won by the
rebel candidate of NC.21 In two of the three constituencies of the Valley, the margin of
votes attained by the winning NC candidate over their PDP rivals was quite high. It was
only in Anantnag constituency that there was a close contest between the two parties. In
the case of Jammu region also, the Congress was able to win the Jammu seat with a very
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solid majority and it was only in Udhampur constituency that there was a neck-to-neck
fight between the Congress and the BJP candidates. 
 
Table 6. Performance of NC, Congress, PDP and BJP – 2009 Parliamentary elections 
 Winner Votes (in %) Runner Up Votes (in %)
Baramulla NC 46.01 PDP 31.32
Srinagar NC 51.99 PDP 41.30
Anantnag NC 46.53 PDP 44.89
Ladakh IND 29.84 INC 26.48
Udhampur INC 37.90 BJP 35.71
Jammu INC 45.33 BJP 30.94
 
The Kashmir region
63 In Kashmir Valley, the NC not only registered its victory in all the three seats of the
region, but also improved its share of votes compared to earlier election. With 38.42%
votes cast in its favour during the 2004 Parliamentary election, it obtained 49.79% votes
during the 2009 Parliamentary elections. This poll percentage was quite high as compared
to the 38.12% votes polled by the PDP (slightly lower than its voter turnout of 39.29% in
2004).  While  the  improvement  of  its  share  of  votes  was  reflected in  each individual
constituency, however, it was in Anantnag constituency that the NC actually doubled its
share of votes as compared to 200422 (from 23.63% in 2004 to 46.53% in 2009). 
 
Table 7. Votes polled (%) by NC and PDP in Kashmir Region – 2009 Parliamentary elections
 NC (in %) PDP (in %)




64 The loss of Anantnag seat was a huge setback for the PDP. Interestingly, Anantnag is the
stronghold of the PDP. The PDP has been dominating both the Parliamentary as well as
Assembly constituencies. In 2004 Parliamentary election, the seat was won by Mehbooba
Mufti with 49.55% votes. And during the 2008 Assembly elections, the party had swept the
four districts falling in this constituency, bagging 12 of the total 16 seats. What reflected
the great decline of the party was its performance in two Assembly segments of Anantnag
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and Wachi from where Muft Syed, the patron of the party and Mehbooba Mufti, the party
president,  had  registered  their  victory  with  massive  mandate  during  the  Assembly
election.  During  the  Parliamentary  elections,  the  vote  share  of  PDP  in  both  these
segments had fallen drastically. 
 
Table 8. Comparative performance of NC and PDP – 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary elections
  
Votes polled (in %
)













65 The loss of the PDP in the Parliamentary elections reflected a change of mood at the
ground level since the Assembly elections. The lower level of participation during the
election also affected the election outcome. The PDP’s was incapable to mobilise as it had
during the Assembly election, thus revealing its complacency during the Parliamentary
elections. Buoyant by its performance during the Assembly elections, the party had taken
its victory for granted during the Parliamentary election. And may be due to this sense of
complacency or may be to show some kind of  proximity with the separatist  politics,
neither Mehbooba nor Mufti Syed cast their own votes.
66 The PDP’s failure to retain its own ground in the Valley could be seen as a rejection of the
‘soft-separatism’ of the party. In order to ground its politics in the local sensibilities, the
PDP borrows heavily from the separatist agenda and often seeks to use emotive slogans to
strengthen its constituency. Even when it was a part of government, it continued to use
the populist rhetoric in order to claim its proximity with the separatist sentiments of
people. It was in the same vein that the party had joined the Amarnath agitation and had
sought to raise the emotive pitch of  Kashmir’s  politics.  Though the party could gain
during the Assembly elections which was conducted in the heat of the sentiments raised
during the Amarnath agitation, it could not take advantage during the Parliamentary
elections. As the situation was normalised, the party lost support at the ground level. 
67 With the rejection of PDP during the Parliamentary elections, the Kashmir region also
seems to have rejected the polarised regional  politics of  the state.  The PDP’s role in
sharpening the regional divide equals to that of the BJP. Both the parties gain mutually by
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stretching the regional  politics  on opposite  side.  While  BJP sharpens the pro-Jammu
sentiments, the PDP arouses pro-Kashmir sentiments. The mutual exclusivity of both the
sentiments  aggravates  the  regional  divide.  The  fact  that  the  communal  elements
automatically creeps in this kind of aggressive regional mobilisation, makes this politics
quite dangerous. 
68 Since Kashmir remains the most important constituency, the NC also indulges in the pro-
Kashmir politics. However, what distinguishes the PDP’s politics from the NC’s is that the
former invokes ‘region’ as well as ‘religion’ in a more aggressive manner. NC’s Kashmir-
centric politics is more oriented towards the Centre, making demands upon it on behalf
of  the State (therefore,  its  emphasis  on State Autonomy).  The PDP’s  politics  is  more
inward looking and therefore focuses on Kashmir region defined in antagonistic terms
vis-à-vis Jammu region. In the definition of regional identity, the religious element of
Kashmiri identity is also invoked.
 
The Jammu region
69 In Jammu region, the BJP was expecting to register its victory in both the seats. During
the 2008 Assembly elections it could return 11 Assembly seats. The performance of the
BJP in this election had raised the hopes of this party for the Parliamentary elections.
However it lost both the seats to Congress. As against the 42.20% votes polled by the
Congress, it could poll only 32.94% votes.23
 
Table 9: Votes polled by BJP and Congress in Jammu region – 2009 Parliamentary elections (%)
 BJP Congress
Jammu region 32.94 42.20
Udhampur constituency 35.71 37.90
Jammu constituency 30.94 45.33
70 Though  both  the  seats  of  Jammu  have  remained  the  traditional  strongholds  of  the
Congress,  the  BJP  could  gain  from  the  communal  polarization  during  the  peak  of
militancy and win both the seats  during the 1998 and 1999 Parliamentary elections.
However during the 2004 elections it lost both the seats. Its expectations in the post-
Amarnath agitation were quite high and it had expected its victory this time as well –
given the intensified mobilization by this party in the Hindu dominated areas of  the
region and the  consequent  polarization between the communities  that  was  reflected
during the period of agitation.24 
 
Table 10. Comparative performance of BJP and INC in Jammu region – 2004 and 2009
Parliamentary elections
 
Votes polled (in %
)
 2004 2009
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Table 11. Jammu constituency over the years: Results of the Parliamentary elections from 1989 to
2009
 










Table 12. Udhampur constituency over the years: Results of the Parliamentary elections from 1989
to 2009
 









71 One definite message that is given by the voters during the Parliamentary elections in
Jammu region is that politics here cannot be controlled by the rightist forces for a long
time. In very certain terms people have shown their antipathy towards the forces that
aim at mobilizing them on religious basis, polarizing them on communal grounds and
generating tensions within the region. People might have been temporarily swayed by
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the emotions raised during the Amarnath agitation, but that is not the normal political
mood of the region. In defeating Leela Karan Sharma from Jammu-Poonch Parliamentary
constituency,  the  people  have  distanced  themselves  not  only  from  the  politics  of
Amarnath agitation but from the communal politics per se. The BJP, despite opposition
from within the cadre, had taken the decision to give ticket to Leela Karan because as
chairman of the Amarnath Sangharsh Samitie, he had become the most important face of
the agitation25.  Confident that the BJP could gain from the popularity of  Leela Karan
during  the  agitation,  the  party  leadership  had  gone  ahead  with  the  Leela  Karan’s
candidature. Leela Karan, however, lost the election with a big margin. 
72 The natural direction of politics of Jammu is quite secular and is manifested in secular
manner in a variety of ways. The plurality of Jammu as well as its multi-layered social and
political dynamics compels the regional politics to take a secular shape. However, in the
absence  of  a  secular  regional  politics  that  takes  into  consideration  not  only  the
sensitivities of the Hindu-heartland of Jammu region but also carries within itself the
political concerns of the backward sub-regions at the periphery, the politics has all the
possibilities of becoming communally divisive. About Amarnath agitation, one can safely
say that,  though it  was manifested in religious terms, the major reason for the mass
mobilization was regional rather than religious. This leads us to argue that communal
elements which generally remain at the margins of Jammu’s politics, seek to appropriate




73 This paper has sought to analyse the intricacies of the electoral politics of the state by
locating it in the prevailing separatist context in the Valley of Kashmir on the one hand
and increasing political divergence on regional basis on the other. The paper has sought
to highlight the reality of separatist politics in Kashmir, despite the fact that there is
increasing space for the mainstream politics. The electoral politics which had become
totally irrelevant in the Valley during the late eighties,  in the wake of militancy and
political upsurge, has again acquired legitimacy not only due to a shift in the nature of
the resistance politics but also due to the changed context of mainstream politics. With
the  emergence  of  PDP  as  another  regional  party  of  Kashmir,  the  hegemony  of  the
National Conference has been fractured and the intensity of electoral competition has
increased. Consequently, the possibilities of manipulation of the electoral politics by the
ruling  party  in  the  centre  have  become quite  remote  and the  distance  between the
electoral  politics  and  the  popular  responses  (that  always  used  to  characterise  the
Kashmir’s electoral politics) has been significantly reduced. 
74 The legitimacy of the electoral politics, however, has been attained within the overall
context of separatism. Rather than challenging the separatist politics, the political parties
have sought to recognise the reality of the conflict situation and limit the scope of their
politics to issues of ‘governance’ only. The divide between the ‘politics of governance’ in
which the political parties indulge and the ‘politics of the ultimate resolution of conflict’
which is  seen as the domain of  the separatist  politics  is  generally recognised by the
political parties, separatist leaders as well as by the common masses. 
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75 The  changed  context  of  electoral  politics  can  go  a  long  way  in  dealing  with  the
separatism, which is actually a reflection of popular alienation. But mere expansion of the
mainstream space and its democratisation may not be sufficient to deal with alienation
and separatist sentiment. It will have to be dealt with separately—through the conflict
resolution mechanism. Till that time, it will remain intact. 
76 The paper has also focused on the political divergence within the state on regional basis.
The political divergence between the Kashmir and Jammu regions reflects not only the
specificity of  the conflict  situation in Kashmir but also the context of  power politics
which  has  traditionally  been  dominated  by  the  political  elite  of  Kashmir.  This  has
resulted in a politics of ‘regional deprivation’ that has often been appropriated by the
Hindu Rightist elements. The Hindu Rightist parties that seek to exploit the generally
prevalent  feeling  of  regional  discrimination  by  communally  polarising  the  political
response of the region have not been successful in electoral terms. However, the kind of
regional cum communal divide that was created in the wake of Amarnath agitation did
result in the substantial electoral gain for the BJP. Similar gain was registered by PDP in
Kashmir Valley
77 The regional  cum communal  polarisation created during the Amarnath agitation and
reflected in the outcome of  the 2008 Assembly elections  led to  a  concern about  the
implications of the divisive politics for the future of the state. However, an altogether
different voter response during the 2009 Parliamentary elections has clearly established
the limitations of politics of regional and communal polarisation in the plural and mixed
society of Jammu and Kashmir. 
78 However, the regional discontent remains a reality of Jammu’s politics and needs to be
addressed. There is also a need for a more secular response to the regional discontent. In
the absence such secular response, the regional discontent is easily appropriated by the
right-wing organisations and gets communalised in the process.  Communally divisive
politics, however, is not only dangerous for the Jammu region but for the whole state. 
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NOTES
1. For  a  detailed  understanding  of  the  background  and  emergence  of  armed  militancy  and
separatist  politics of Kashmir,  see M J Akbar (1991),  Sumit Ganguly (1997),  Victoria Schofield
(2000), Sumantra Bose (1997, 2003), Vernon Hewitt (1995) 
2. Along  with  MUF,  the  opposition  to  the  NC-Congress  combine  was  given  by  the  People’s
Conference led by Abdul Gani Lone. While MUF could poll 31.8% votes, the People’s Conference
could get 6.4% votes. 
3. For instance, the NC candidate in Bijbihera won the election with a margin of 100 votes only. In
Wachi the margin of victory of the winning candidate was of 122 votes and in Shopian it was of
336 votes. Moreover, there was a huge number of votes which were declared invalid. Thus 6.7%
votes polled in Doru, 5.6% in Chrar-e-Sharief, 4.9% in Homshilbug, 4.8% in Wachi and Sangrama
each,  4.5%  in  Amirakadal  and  4.2%  votes  in  Handwara  were  rejected.  In  most  of  the
constituencies of narrow victories, the number of invalid votes was quite high. In fact in the
three above stated constituencies of Bijbihera, Wachi and Shopian with very narrow margins of
victory, the number of invalid votes was much higher than the margin with which the winning
candidates had been declared victorious. Thus 1177 votes were declared invalid in Bijbihera, 1806
in Wachi and 1122 in Shopian.
4. With common people openly identifying with separatist politics,  the farcical nature of the
electoral politics became very clear during the 1989 Parliamentary elections. Not only were there
not many keen contestants ready to fight this election, but there were also not many voters
ready to vote. For the two of three constituencies which went to poll (the third was returned
uncontested), only 5% voters cast their votes.
5. It was exactly 29.64% voter turnout for the Valley of Kashmir. Interestingly in few districts like
Kupwara,  Budgam and Baramulla,  the voter  turnout  was as  high as  53.15%,  46% and 40.09%
respectively. The voter turnout in Ananntnag and Pulwama was moderate—24.05% and 23.68%
respectively. It was in the Srinagar district that the lowest turnout—11.17%. 
6. That is the reason why the National Conference, which was ousted from power in 1984 due to
the defections engineered by the Congress,  not only risked its  popularity by going in for an
alliance with the same party, but also took the open position of remaining on the right side of the
ruling party of the Centre in order to stay in power. Going against its own ideology, it even chose
to side with the BJP-led NDA during the late nineties.
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7. Sheikh was arrested on the suspicion that he was not happy with the Accession of the State
with India and was hobnobbing with the Americans around the idea of independence of Kashmir.
However, as Mir Qasim has revealed in his book, he was also a victim of a local conspiracy led by
his own cabinet colleagues led by Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. 
8. The disjuncture between the National Conference and the popular responses was also reflected
earlier, especially after the Party opted for entering into alliance with the Congress party. The
support that the Muslim United Front enjoyed before the 1987 Assembly election was mainly due
to the disillusionment with the politics that this party was pursuing. 
9. The competitive nature of regional politics of Kashmir ultimately resulted in deeper changes
in the power politics of the State. The fragmented verdict at the regional level and the failure of
any party to obtain a  majority  of  seats  led to the formation of  a  coalition government.  The
important aspect of this post-2002 coalition politics is that is it representative of both regions.
Fragmented verdict during the 2002 Assembly election led to the alliance between the PDP and
the Congress and formation of their government along with few other smaller parties. The NC
emerged as the largest party with presence in all the three regions of the state and chose to sit in
opposition. This arrangement reflected greater democratisation of the politics of the state from a
number  of  angles.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  politics  of  Kashmir  had  become  intensely
competitive and rooted in local concerns, it had, for the first time, space for genuine opposition.
The NC due to its numerical strength could operate as an effective opposition party and could put
sufficient  pressure  on  the  ruling  coalition.  Meanwhile,  there  was  a  wider  base  for  the
government with one of the coalition partners having its support base in Kashmir region, the
other in Jammu. 
10. Shri Amarnath Shrine Board was formed by the government of J&K in 2000 with the purpose
of managing the pilgrimage to Amarnath shrine in South of Kashmir. During the peak of summer,
the shrine attracts thousands of pilgrims from all over India.
11. General  Sinha  had  earlier  incensed  many  Kashmiris  with  a  self-proclaimed  agenda  of
changing the ‘mindset’ in Kashmir which he set about doing by redefining ‘Kashmiri-yat’ based
essentially  on its  Hindu past.  As  chancellor  of  the  University  of  Kashmir,  he  patronised the
Centre for Kashmir Studies which was frequently used to propagate his views. 
12. After the first phase of agitation which culminated with the revocation of the Government
Order,  the  agitation acquired  a  form in  which the  two regions  were  placed in  a  completely
antagonistic form. The revocation of the Order after the mass response in Kashmir was projected
as anti-Hindu and anti-Jammu act of  the state government and therefore led to a prolonged
agitation in Jammu which lasted for more than two months. To quell the sharpened regional
response in Jammu, the State government took the decision to restore 800 canal of land in Baltal
to Shri Amarnath Shrin Board. This government decision led to a fresh phase of agitation in
Kashmir  during  which  sharp  regional  sentiments  were  expressed.  Specifically,  there  were
reactions against the ‘economic blockade’ of Kashmir during the Jammu agitation. So strong was
the anti-Jammu response in Kashmir at that time that the traders took a decision to severe their
links with their Jammu counterparts. 
13. Since 2002, when the era of coalition politics started, Jammu started having a substantial
share in power politics. That is the reason why the voices raising the demand for a separate
Jammu state were not raised and the forces of Right were quite marginalised (this was reflected
in just one seat in favour of BJP and one for Jammu State Morcha). However during the Amarnath
agitation, the forces of Right were able to mobilise the people from urban centres of Jammu by
combining religious sentiment with regional factor.
14. Though much of the electoral discourse in Kashmir revolves around the ‘bigger issues’ like
the ideas of ‘self-government’, ‘autonomy’, there are also issues which confront the people on
routine basis.  The idea of  de-militarisation of  PDP,  for instance,  is  very much located in the
problems faced by people due to the continued presence of security forces. The ‘healing touch’
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policy advocated by PDP similarly involves the rehabilitation of people adversely affected by
violence. 
15. The communal polarisation of the electoral politics of the State is not unprecedented. The
1983 Assembly elections are known to be one of the most communally polarised elections of the
State.  In an intensely contested election between the National  Conference and Congress,  the
Congress was able to mobilise the Hindu voters of Jammu and register its massive victory in this
region. 
16. With Congress-PDP being the major partners of the coalition government, it represented a
balance of forces between Jammu and Kashmir. Congress was having its strong base in Jammu
and the PDP in Kashmir. Besides a very effective representation of Jammu based leaders in the
Ministry, there was a system of rotation for the position of CM and Deputy CM between the two
parties and regions. For the first three years of the coalition, the position of Chief Minister was
held by Kashmir based PDP leader Mufti Mohd Sayeed (with Mangat Ram Sharma of Congress, a
leader of Jammu holding the position of Deputy CM) and after that the position of CM was held by
Ghulam Nabi Azad, a Jammu-based Congress leader with Muzzafar Hussain Beg of PDP holding
the position of Deputy CM. Due to the changed context of power structure, the scope of politics
based on regional discontent was somewhat restricted.
17. It cannot be argued that the positive response of the Kashmiris towards the electoral process
has amounted to the decline in their separatist sentiments. On the contrary, the assertion of the
separatist sentiments, especially since the Amarnath agitation, has become more intense. One
can  see  the  intensity  of  such  sentiments  through  the  mass  demonstrations  against  cases  of
Human Rights violations. Ever since 2007, such demonstrations have been frequently organised
all over the Valley. A glimpse of the deep-rooted separatist sentiment is also given by the massive
funeral processions of the militants killed by the security forces. 
18. Though the present phase of Kashmir separatist politics was initiated in 1989, it was only in
1993 that the APHC was formed to give a political face to the separatist sentiment. This sentiment
was represented till that time, by the armed militancy on the one hand and the spontaneous
popular  upsurge  on  the  other.  Throughout  the  period  of  1990,  there  were  massive
demonstrations in Kashmir Valley. Thousands of people would march on the streets raising the
slogan  of  Azadi.  The  repressive  measures  adopted  by  the  state  soon  restrained  the  public
expression of the mass response, the intensity of the armed militancy, however continued. The
beginning of the decade of 1990s saw a mushroom growth of militant organizations. Apart from
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the initiator of armed militancy in Kashmir, the Hizbul
Mujahideen, had emerged as the major militant organization having a local support base. The
Hizb, supported by Pakistan, launched soon after its emergence a major offensive on JKLF and
succeeded in eliminating its cadres to a large extent. It was in this context of the mutual rivalry
that a need was felt to organise all the militant and separatist groups under the banner of a
single umbrella organization. The All Party Hurriyat Conference was therefore organised in 1993.
19. The high expectations that people have from the local politicians were demonstrated in 2007
when various agitations were launched around the issue of opening of colleges and restructuring
of the districts and Tehsils. 
20. Interestingly, there has been a strong refutation of the communal charge on the part of the
vocal middle class, media, traders and the politicians of Jammu. Soon after the agitation, the
regional dimensions of the agitation were highlighted and the religious sentiments expressed
during the agitation were underplayed. 
21. Though the seat of was officially contested by the Congress candidate, the NC cadre of Ladakh
rather than supporting him, worked for the victory of the NC rebel candidate who was able to
wrest the seat defeating the official candidate of the alliance partners. 
22. In Baramulla constituency, the NC candidate Sharif ud din Shariq won the election by polling
203022 votes as against 138208 votes of PDP candidate Mohammad Dilawar Mir. Sajad Gani Lone
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of People’s Conference polled 65403 votes. Please elaborate on the defeat of S.G. Lone. In Srinagar
constituency, NC candidate Farooq Abdullah won the election by polling 147075 votes as against
116793 of Moulvi Iftikhar Ansari of PDP. In Anantnag constituency, Mirza Mehboob Beg won the
election by polling 148317 votes as against 143093 votes polled by PDP candidate, Peer Mohd.
Hussain. 
23. In Udhampur constituency, the Congress candidate, Ch. Lal Singh won the election by polling
2318153 won the seat by defeating BJP candidate Dr. Nirmal Singh who polled 218459 votes. In
Jammu constituency,  the Congress candidate,  Madan Lal  Sharma won the election by polling
382305 votes as against 260932 votes polled by his nearest rival, Leela Karan Sharma of BJP. 
24. However, the effect of the mobilization by the BJP does not seem to be lasting. Though it
could get a large number of votes from Hindus (exceeding its hold from 11 Assembly segments to
13), it failed to get the advantage of winning the seats as it had in 1998 and 1999. It could not get
all the Hindu votes of the region. The Congress could get a substantial number of Hindu votes.
(The NC-Congress  combine also gained in  the region—with lead in  21 Assembly segments  as
compared to victory in 19 seats during 2008 Assembly elections).
25. The opposition to Leelakaran’s candidature came from within the party on the ground that
he was seen as an outsider who had not been associated with the politics of BJP in any form. 
ABSTRACTS
The paper analyses the 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu and Kashmir in the context of the
conflict situation of the last two decades. The separatist sentiment, the paper argues, remains
ascendant,  even  though  mainstream  politics  (that  had  become  totally  irrelevant  during  the
initial years of militancy and political upsurge) has been gradually gaining space. Rather than
challenging  separatist  politics,  mainstream  politics  is  seeking  to  legitimise  itself  by
acknowledging  its  own  limitations  and  confining  itself  to  the  politics  of  ‘governance’  while
leaving for separatist politics the issue of the ‘ultimate resolution of conflict’. However, in this
process  of  legitimisation,  mainstream politics  has  taken up many issues  from the  agenda of
separatist politics. Consequently, despite the distinction between the two kinds of politics, there
exists  an overlap between them.  The paper  also  focuses  on the political  divergence and the
assertion of regional/religious identity politics. The Amarnath agitation, which took place a few
months before the Parliamentary elections, became the basis of massive political mobilisation
and reaffirmation of the popular separatist  sentiment in Kashmir and religious cum regional
identity politics in Jammu. As such, it forms an important reference point for the analysis. The
paper  also  focuses  on  the  2008  Assembly  election,  which  immediately  preceded  the
Parliamentary elections.
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